Firstly, it appears that the European Commission and the European courts have adopted a `uniform` approach to the various forms of linkage, i.e. the contractual link (including the commitment of primary products and consumables) and the integration of products have been assessed in the same way, without taking into account the various underlying effects on competition and efficiency considerations (for example. B the use of consumables as a means of measurement). None of this is satisfactory. Hylton and Salinger state in a recent paper: “From an economic point of view,… there is no basis for a father`s rule, even given the conditions set at Jefferson Parish for the initiation of the rule. 142 Indeed, the main reason for a decades-long economic inquiry into the effects of engagement on competition is that competition authorities should not consider the link and consolidation to be anti-competitive, even if they are carried out by monopolistic companies. Secondly, there are few signs of changes in EU engagement policy, modelled on US cartel legislation and abuse of dominance. There is no indication that the position of the European Commission and the European courts has become less hostile over the years. 2. SECOND SCREEN: IS AN ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECT PLAUSIBLE? Suppose the market situation allows the link to have an anti-competitive effect.
The next question is whether the coupling agreement in question can have an anti-competitive effect. Like the first screen, this issue can only be addressed by examining the actual circumstances of the disputed market. Unlike the first screen, only a “theory” of how the engagement system will have anti-competitive effects and whether this “theory” applies to current real circumstances. Let`s not overestimate the requirements – you don`t need a fully specified mathematical theory of attachment that was published in an economic magazine. But it is necessary to have a theory that can be confirmed or falsified by testing the theory against facts.155 In some cases, it will be possible to remove a theory “from the shelf”. In other cases, it will be necessary to develop a theory adapted to the facts of the case, including the companies concerned and possibly the state institutions. Unlike other terms of sale, such as trust, bundling and exclusive transactions. B commitment agreements can, in certain situations, create liability in themselves for cartels and abuse of dominance.